Maryland Law Review
Volume 16 | Issue 2

Article 6

Recovery of Money Paid Under a Mistake of Law Baltimore & Annapolis R. Co. v. Carolina Coach
Co.
P. McEvoy Cromwell

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr
Part of the Property Law and Real Estate Commons
Recommended Citation
P. M. Cromwell, Recovery of Money Paid Under a Mistake of Law - Baltimore & Annapolis R. Co. v. Carolina Coach Co., 16 Md. L. Rev.
147 (1956)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr/vol16/iss2/6

This Casenotes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Maryland Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, please
contact smccarty@law.umaryland.edu.

1956]

B. & A. R. CO. v. COACH CO.

held that "Martial rule can never exist where the courts
are open, and in the proper and unobstructed exercise of
their jurisdiction. It is also confined to the locality of actual
war.''2 In noting that the Constitution gave power to Congress to provide for trial of persons connected with the
military service, the court stated, "All other persons, citizens of states where the courts are open, if charged with
crime, are guaranteed the inestimable privilege of trial
by jury."2 4
United States v. Quarles has clarified the law in the
third class of cases. Civilian citizens are not amenable to
military trial for crimes committed in their prior military
status, though they may be tried by the federal courts if
Congress so directs.
LOWELL R. Bowm

Recovery Of Money Paid Under A Mistake Of Law
Baltimore & Annapolis R. Co. v. CarolinaCoach Co.1
In 1950, under the terms of a sub-lease of a bus terminal
from the Baltimore and Annapolis Railroad Co., appellant,
to the Red Star Motor Line, both parties were to have joint
control over one designated ticket agent and the lessee was
given the right to pay
the salary of this employee and
to deduct this amount of money from its monthly rent payment, should it elect to do so. Red Star paid the entire
salary of this employee until December 1950, when he resigned and was replaced by another ticket agent, who was
paid entirely by B. & A. until January, 1953. During the
first period (ending December 1950), Red Star deducted
from its rent payments an amount equal to only
the
salary of the ticket agent, even though it was paying his
entire salary. During the second period (from December
'50 to January '53), B. & A. paid the entire salary and added
an amount of money equal to one half of the salary of the
"Ibid, 127. An interesting case arising during World War II In this
area was Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U. S. 304 (1946), holding that
"martial law" in the Hawaiian Organic Act, while authorizing vigorous
military action to preserve order and defend the Islands, did not authorize
the supplanting of the courts by military tribunals.
Ibid, 123. For the separate but related problem of enforcement of
military orders by the federal courts, see Hirabayashi v. United States, 320
U. S. 81 (1943), upholding the conviction of petitioner for violation of a
curfew order promulgated by the military commander pursuant to an act
of Congress during World War II.
1206 Md. 237, 111 A. 2d 464 (1955).
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ticket agent to the rental bills which were submitted to and
were paid without comment or objection first by Red Star
and then by its successor (through a merger effected in
1952), the Carolina Coach Co. In effect, Red Star and Carolina Coach had borne the burden throughout both periods
of
the salary of this designated ticket agent, even though
the terms of the leasing agreement required that B. & A.
be ultimately responsible for the entire salary of this employee. On January 21, 1953, Carolina demanded repayment from B. & A. of an amount equal to
the salaries of
both the ticket agents who had been employed consecutively from December '50 to January '53. B. & A. refused
this demand, and Carolina brought suit at law to recover
this money. The Court of Comtnon Pleas of Baltimore found
for the plaintiff, and B. & A. appealed.
It was contended by B. & A. that the payments sought
to be recovered were made by reason of a mistake of law
on the part of Carolina Coach, and, hence, fell within the
broad rule that payments made voluntarily under a mistake
of law may not be recovered. However, the Court held "that
the error of Red Star and of Carolina as to their private
rights and liabilities in making the payments in question
should be regarded ... as not a mistake of law, pure and
simple, so as to bar a recovery of the overpayments, but as
involving a mistaken view of the facts",2 and accordingly
affirmed the judgment for plaintiff.
Two problems presented by such cases are: (a) Whether
the facts show that the mistake which resulted in overpayments was a mistake of fact, or a mistake of law, or, possibly, a combination of both; and (b) To what extent must
the result reached by the Court in such a case be governed
by its determinations in regard to the first question?
The Court, through Chief Judge Brune, does not explicitly answer either question;' but, assuming that if the
mistake were purely one of law recovery would be precluded, it infers that even if an academic analysis of the
circumstances of the overpayment would indicate that the
plaintiff's mistake may involve a conclusion of law, nonetheless, in deciding the case, the mistake would be regarded
by the Court as though it were one of fact, and recovery
Ibid, 245.

'Did the plaintiff make a mistake as to the actual contents, the terms,
of the leasing agreement which would be a mistake of fact, or did the plaintiff merely misinterpret the legal operation of the terms which would be a
mistake of law? Such questions are not susceptible to proof of a substantial objective nature.

19561

B. & A. R. CO. v. COACH CO.

would be permitted on that basis. The Court cited Pomeroy's statement that:
"Mistakes... of a person with respect to his own
private legal rights and liabilities may be properly regarded, - as in great measure they really
are, - and
'4
may be dealt with as mistakes of fact."
Not quoted by the Maryland Court, and apparently not
accepted as explanation of the Court's approach, is Pomeroy's further conclusion that:
"A general rule permitting the jurisdiction of equity
to relieve from mistakes of the law pure and simple,
in all cases belonging to this species, and confining its
operation to them, would at once reduce to clearness,
order, and certainty a subject which has hitherto been
confessedly uncertain and confused."5
It is quite clear, however, that Pomeroy was dealing with
mistakes as to private legal rights and liabilities not resulting in payments of money, for Pomeroy subsequently states
an exception to this proposed general rule:
"The general rule stated in the paragraph (§849)
concerning mistakes as to one's own private legal rights
and duties, is also subject to another important limitation. It is settled at law, and the rule has been followed
in equity, that money paid under a mistake of law with
respect to the liability to make payment, but with full
knowledge, or with means of obtaining knowledge, of
all the circumstances, cannot be recovered back."'
In the instant case, the Maryland Court proceeded to its
result in an interesting fashion. It went to Pomeroy to help
support its conclusion that the error here, even if one of law,
should be treated as a mistake of fact, and in a proceeding
at law, applied Pomeroy's general rule for granting equitable relief, even though that author has acknowledged
that cases of money payments made under mistake of law
form a well defined exception to the general rule, and therefore constitute a class in which relief has been denied. If
the instant case is accepted as involving a payment of
money under mistake of law, the Court of Appeals has
adopted Pomeroy's general doctrine, but has rejected one of
the limitations that has been commonly applied to it. That
'3 PO!EROy, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (5th ed., 1941), Sec. 849, 309.
'Ibid, 310.
Ibid, Sec. 581, 318, et 8eq. Italics supplied.
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Pomeroy, himself, might approve such a course of action is
indicated by his statement in a footnote:
"If the doctrine formulated in §849 be correct, then
it seems that this particular rule forbidding the recovery back of money paid under a mistake of law is
based upon an erroneous conception of the principle
which should govern such cases. This rule itself is an
illustration of the disinclination of equity courts to depart from a doctrine, settled at law, when the rights and
the remedies are the same in both jurisdictions."7
Near the end of the opinion the Court says:
"The Restatement, Restitution, in the Introductory
Note to Ch. 2, Topic 3, 'Mistake of Law' (page 180)
points out that the broad rule against relief from the
consequences of a mistake of law has been considerably
limited to avoid the injustice which would result from
the universal application of so broad a rule and that
'by a process of attrition it has been limited to cases
similar to that of Bilbie v. Lumley (2 East 469, in which
the broad rule was first announced), that is, to cases
where a benefit has been conferred upon another because of a supposed duty to him in response to an honest
demand by him'."'
It appears, however, that the Court of Appeals may have
gone further than the Restatement in granting relief, for
it could be reasoned that in the instant case plaintiff overpaid defendant "because of a supposed duty to him and in
response to an honest demand by him". When the defenthe salary of the ticket
dant added an amount equal to
agent to the monthly rental bills and submitted these bills
to plaintiff who paid them, there was, presumably, an
"honest demand" by defendant which was certainly complied with by plaintiff "because of a supposed duty" to defendant. Bilbie v. Lumley's fact situation is embodied in
the Restatement as follows:
"A insures his ship with the B insurance company
and innocently fails to reveal facts, as the result of
which the insurance policy creates no liability on the
part of the insurance company. Upon the happening of
the loss, B, now with full knowledge of the facts, pays
7Ibid, 319, footnote 7. And see also 5 WrLmSTON, CONTRACTS (Rev. ed.,

1937), Sec. 1589, 4435, et seq., saying: "There seems no logical reason for
distinguishing in this particular (mistake as to private antecedent rights)
between a bill to reform or to rescind and an action for money had and
received." Parenthetical material added.
6Supra, n. 1, 245.
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A, both A and B mistakenly believing that B is liable
upon the policy. B is not entitled to restitution."9
There is no question that B was mistaken as to its private
legal rights, duties, and liabilities. Conceivably, if Bilbie
v. Lumley were to come before the Maryland Court today,
it could grant B the right to recover on the basis of its holding in the instant case that if payment is made because of
a mistake as to the payor's private rights and liabilities, such
error will be regarded by the Court as a mistake of fact and
the right to recover the money granted accordingly. °
As direct Maryland authority for application of this
doctrine, the Court in the instant opinion quoted from and
relied heavily upon its application in the equity case of
Oxenham v. Mitchell in 1931." Before 1931, recovery back
of money paid by mistake had been allowed in Maryland, 2
but in all of these instances the mistake was decided to be
one of fact, and recovery was granted on that theory. There
had been numerous cases brought seeking recovery for
money paid because of a mistake of law in which relief was
denied. A great many of these involved taxpayers seeking
to recover money paid to a municipality as taxes that subsequently were declared illegal by the courts. 3 In all these
tax cases the court denied the right of the plaintiff to recover, citing the basic rule that there could be no recovery
of a payment made voluntarily under a mistake of law on
the part of the payor. The Court of Appeals stated:
"But the character of the payment never depends,
as we have seen, on the knowledge of the party, and if
voluntary, it is binding, although made under the impression, that the demand was legal."' 4
9RESTATEMENT,

RESTITUTION (1937), See. 45, Illustration 2, 185.

10It is well to remember that there are many mistake of fact situations

in which the courts will refuse to grant the right to recover back money
paid out by mistake as, for example, in cases where the agreement between
the parties is in the nature of a compromise of a disputed issue, or where
the mistake was collateral to and not directly material to the agreement
between the parties, or where the risk of mistake has 'been expressly or
impliedly assumed by one or both of the parties to the transaction, or
where the circumstances are such that the dictates of good faith and conscience do not require that the plaintiff should recover the money from the
defendant. For an analysis of all such situations see RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION (1937), See. 15, et seq.
U160 Md. 269, 153 A. 71 (1931), noted 17 Va. L. Rev. 602 (1931).
12Baltimore and Susq. R.R. Co. v. Faunce, 6 Gill. 68 (Md., 1847) ; Citizens'
Bank v. Grafflin, 31 Md. 507 (1869).
M. & C. C. of Balt. v. Lefferman, 4 Gill 425 ('Md., 1846); Morris v.
Mayor & C. C. of Balt., 5 Gill 244 (Md., 1847) ; Lester v. Baltimore, 29 Md.
415 (1868) ; Mayor and C. C. of Balt. v.. Hussey, 67 Md. 112, 9 A. 19 (1887) ;
Monticello Co. v. Balto. City, 90 Md. 416, 45 A. 210 (1900) ; Baltimore v.
Harvey, 118 Md. 275, 84 A. 487 (1912).
,,Mayor and C. C. of Balt. v. Lefferman, ibid, 433.
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And in another earlier case the Court quoted with clear
approval Pomeroy's refusal to include money paid under
mistake of law as being subject to his general rule allowing
equity to correct mistakes of law as to private legal rights,
saying in part:
"But in paragraph 851 he (Pomeroy) says, 'it is
settled at law, and the rule has been followed in equity,
that money paid under a mistake of law, with respect
to the liability to make payment, but with full knowledge or with means of obtaining knowledge of all the
circumstances, cannot be recovered back'."' 5
In Oxenham v. Mitchell,"6 the plaintiffs filed a bill in
equity to recover money which was paid in order to free
their land from a supposedly outstanding leasehold interest
which, however, had long before been extinguished. Plaintiffs mistakenly thought that they lacked full legal title to
the land, although they knew all the facts and circumstances which had occurred in reference to the land and
which would clearly have indicated that plaintiffs had a full
legal title to the land, if the proper legal interpretation had
been applied to these facts and circumstances. Plaintiffs
had erred, apparently, through a mistake of law, but the
Court wrote:
"It is justly observed by Pomeroy: 'A private legal
right, title, estate, interest, duty or liability is always a
very complex conception. It necessarily depends so
much upon conditions of fact, that it is difficult, if not
impossible, to form a distinct notion of a private legal
right, interest or liability separated from the facts in
which it is involved and upon which it depends. Mistakes, therefore, of a person with respect to his own
private legal rights and liabilities may be properly
regarded - as in a great measure they really are and may be dealt with as mistakes of fact.... It is not
the less a representation of fact because the fact stated
involves a conclusion of law,...
The plaintiffs were allowed to recover. It is interesting
that the Court in an opinion by Judge Parke, referring to
Pomeroy's general rule and the exception which precludes
11Baltimore v. Harvey, 118 Md. 275, 279, 84 A. 487 (1912). This quotation,
as we have already seen (n. 6), embodies an exception to Pomeroy's general
rule for granting relief in mistake of law situations.
11Supra, n. 11.
7 lbid, 280.
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recovery of money payments made under mistake of law,'18
chose to avoid this historic exception by treating the situation as being one of mistake of fact and hence within Pomeroy's general rule. 9
In the instant case, the Court holds that the rule which
the Oxenham case applied in equity applied at law, i.e.,
payments made because of a mistake of law as to the private
legal rights, duties, and liabilities of the payor will be
viewed by the Court as though the mistake was one of fact,
and recovery granted accordingly." In doing so, it has
joined the ranks of a growing number of jurisdictions that
have tended in recent years to put mistake of law and mistake of fact on more of an even footing than they have been
in the past. This could probably be said to have the support of the leading treatises of Pomeroy on Equity and
Williston on Contracts, but with a recommendation for
frank recognition on the part of the Courts that in this area
mistake of law as to particular private rights may be corrected as well as mistake of fact.2
P. McEvoy CROMWELL
Ibid, 278-279.
Equity courts in Maryland have granted various other types of equitable
relief to parties who have acted under a mistake of law and suffered
thereby. Three illustrative cases are: Lammot v. Bowly, 6 H. & J. 500
(Md., 1825) ; Broumel v. White, 87 Md. 521, 39 A. 1047 (1898) ; Prince de
Bearn v. Winans, 111 Md. 434, 74 A. 626 (1909).
But never before Oxenham v. Mitchell had equity allowed recovery of
money paid by reason of a mistake of law, unless the case of Carroll v.
Bowling, 151 Md. 59, 133 A. 851 (1926), be considered as such an instance.
Here the court allowed a group of executors to recover from the estate of
life tenants money equal to a sum which the executors had placed (because
of a mistake of law) in the hands of life tenants who had squandered it
away to -the detriment of the remaindermen. However, this case was decided more on the basis of the theory of subrogation than anything else,
although at page 67 the court said:
"Even if such a mistake . . . could be properly described as one of
the objection would not, in our opinion, apply to prevent the
law ....
operation of... subrogation ...
20 Of course, in all these cases it is necessary, in addition, for the plaintiff to prove that he is entitled to recovery of the money as against the
defendant who in good faith and conscience ought to pay it over to the
plaintiff. In other words, the plaintiff must prove not only that he acted
by reason of mistake, but that defendant's retention of the money would
be something in the nature of an unjust enrichment of the defendant at
the expense of the plaintiff. Unless the plaintiff proves this part of his
case, the mere fact that he acted through mistake of a private right or duty
or liability will not enable him to recover. For two cases illustrative of
this type of situation see Konig v. M. & C. C. of Balt., 128 Md. 465, 97 A. 837
(1916) and Gist et a]. v. Drakely, 2 Gill 330 (Md., 1844). See also fn. 2,
supra.
21Circa, supra, ns. 5, 7. Cf. 5 WILLISTON, CoNTACTS (Rev. ed., 1937),
Sees. 1566, 1574, 1584, 1589, for treatment of the Oxenham case.
'8
19

